Land disputes have a distinctive procedural character because the disputed object must be precisely identifiable in terms of location, area, boundaries, and legal status. Problems arise when discrepancies occur between the posita, petitum, land documents, and the factual condition of the land. On the one hand, the passive judge principle and the prohibition of ultra petita under Article 178 paragraph (3) HIR and Article 189 paragraph (3) RBg require judges to remain within the scope of the dispute submitted by the parties. On the other hand, judicial independence, the obligation to explore legal values and justice, and the need to produce an executable judgment require judges not to be mechanically bound by merely technical errors in pleadings. This research examines the limits of judicial authority in reconstructing civil claims in land disputes and formulates parameters distinguishing legitimate reconstruction from ultra petita. This normative legal research employs statutory, conceptual, and case approaches. Primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials are analyzed prescriptively by comparing legislation, legal doctrine, and Supreme Court decisions. The research finds that the passive judge principle should not be interpreted absolutely in relation to technical and identificatory aspects of the disputed object. Reconstruction is legitimate when it merely clarifies the identity of the object, does not expand the scope of the dispute, and does not create a new right or form of relief. Conversely, substantive changes to the parties, object, or relief constitute ultra petita. This study proposes a Three-Test Model, consisting of the Identity Test, Scope Test, and Relief Test, as a framework for bounded judicial activism in land disputes. Keywords: Civil Procedure; Judicial Independence; Land Disputes; Judicial Reconstruction; Passive Judge Principle; Ultra Petita.
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