Claim Missing Document
Check
Articles

Found 13 Documents
Search

Iqbal Humanism and Human Rights Mustofa Anshori Lidinillah; Mukhtasar Syamsuddin; Arqom Kuswanjono
Jurnal Filsafat "WISDOM" Vol 33, No 1 (2023)
Publisher : Fakultas Filsafat, Universitas Gadjah Mada Yogyakarta

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.22146/jf.81126

Abstract

Contrasting religion with human rights is a critical response that is unproductive because basically the relationship between religion and human rights is ambivalent. Meanwhile, freedom of religion is understood as part of human rights, but in reality, religious practices emerge which result in violations of human rights. This research wants to answer the question of how to bridge the relationship between religion and human rights by taking the case of Iqbal's concept of humanism, "How does Iqbal's humanism reconcile religion and human rights?" This study uses the hermeneutic-philosophical method by applying the following methodical steps: interpretation, analysis-synthesis, internal coherence, description, and heuristics. The results of the research show that Iqbal's humanism as a framing that reconciles religion and human rights based on a reciprocal relationship between religion and humanity. Tauhid as a working idea and the main spiritual basis for building a civilization with a human perspective contains values that are in accordance with the principles of human rights. The development of a new civilization with human insight must be pursued intellectually and vitally. Religion is a mode of human development as long as it is not accepted dogmatically. Therefore, Iqbal's humanism has a very strong relevance in efforts to uphold the principles of human rights in people's lives. 
Kritik Fenomenologis Merleau-Ponty atas Filsafat Pengetahuan Mukhtasar Syamsuddin
TSAQAFAH Vol. 6 No. 2 (2010)
Publisher : Universitas Darussalam Gontor

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.21111/tsaqafah.v6i2.118

Abstract

The main purpose of this article consists in investigating the phenomenological perspective used by Merleau-Ponty in evaluating critically the conception of knowledge. This investigation is aimed at finding a new path for understanding the essence of knowledge that is formulated by some philosophical mainstreams, such as naturalism and objectivism. Ponty’s phenomenological critique to the philosophy of knowledge is related to to the description of knowledge as a human condition, which makes the thinking of the knowledge problem possible. The phenomenological account that Ponty offers is that we experience ourselves, not as distinct ‘minds’ and ‘bodies’, but as unified persons who form intentions and act in the world, but can do so only because our bodies function mechanically in certain ways. As being poured in his work “the Structure of Behavior”, Ponty explained that the integration of matter, life and mind are obtained by reduction to a common denominator of physical form. This explanation emphasized that the Gestalists had misunderstood the ultimate implications of their own work, because they believed that the notion of structure can be thought within the naturalist ontology that subtended the thought of the atomists whom they had criticized.
Lahirnya Tensi Metafisik di Urat-Leher Projek-Projek Interpretasi Konstruktif Bakir, Herman; Syamsuddin, Mukhtasar
Jurnal Hukum & Pembangunan
Publisher : UI Scholars Hub

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar

Abstract

This project is a legal hermeneutics. The aim is to elaborate the paradigm of the law as integrity theory, Ronald Dworkin’s work, which has received recognition as one of the most influential philosophical systems in the world of law throughout the last century. The issues discussed are divided into three subjects: (1) the interpretation role in legitimizing “law” as a corpus that has a “soul”; (2) a concept of interpretation from the womb of the law as integrity theory; (3) the dual capacity of “constructive interpretation” in [a] “returning” law to its roots; and [b] housing “morals” within the body of positive law. The result: a kind of final picture for us: (1) The legal text (is a narrative that is) “living”. It is not just bones, flesh, and blood. This is the only component that is never finished in a text. It is always in statu interpretandi—like “a fruit that is never fully ripe.” The reason is its virtus flexibilitatis, which is unmatched by other components—its ability to evolve infinitely, to reincarnate, to adapt in mutatio temporum. At the heart of this pars invisibilis, resides the “soul” that has made every text of legal rules alive, functional, and truly working in its society; (2) Dworkin believes that the soul of every text can only be captured by using constructive interpretation—an interpretive technique that makes the theory of the law as integrity a “great teacher” for it. This theory indoctrinates every judge: the furthest goal of every interpretation is to find the “most sublime point of intersection” between the “three teleological factions”: [a] mens legislatoris; [b] contentio logica and [c] contentio moralis. There, resides the soul of every legal text; (3) This intersection actively drives the internalization and integration of moral values into the legal framework.