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All Journal Melintas An International Journal of Philosophy and Religion Veritas et Justitia Jurnal IUS (Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan) PADJADJARAN Jurnal Ilmu Hukum (Journal of Law) Justitia et Pax Undang: Jurnal Hukum Humaniora Kosmik Hukum Jurnal Dekonstruksi Jurnal Pembumian Pancasila : Mewujudkan TRISAKTI sebagai Pedoman Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat
Tristam P. Moeliono
Jurusan Ilmu Hukum, Fakultas Hukum Universitas Katolik Parahyangan, Bandung
Religion Arts Humanities Education Languange, Linguistic, Communication & Media Law, Crime, Criminology & Criminal Justice Social Sciences Other

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Spesiasi Kecerdasan Buatan dan Dimensi Subjek Hukumnya Simanjuntak, Mardohar; Moeliono, Tristam P.
Dekonstruksi Vol. 11 No. 04 (2025): Jurnal Dekonstruksi Volume 11.4
Publisher : Gerakan Indonesia Kita

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.54154/dekonstruksi.v11i04.356

Abstract

Artikel ini memeriksa kemungkinan kecerdasan buatan (AI) dikategorikan sebagai spesies baru sekaligus prospek statusnya sebagai subjek hukum. Spesies lazimnya didefinisikan berdasarkan dua atribut utama: kecerdasan (intelligence) dan kesadaran (consciousness). Namun, Yuval Noah Harari menyatakan bahwa dalam perkembangan teknologi mutakhir, kesadaran telah dilepaskan (decoupled) dari kecerdasan. Artinya, entitas nir-sadar dapat menjadi sangat cerdas; dan karena kecerdasan menjadi parameter yang lebih relevan, AI patut dipertimbangkan sebagai spesies baru. Dalam kerangka ini, mesin cerdas bukan lagi sekadar alat bantu, melainkan agensi epistemik yang berdiri sendiri. Pertanyaannya kemudian bergeser tentang apakah spesies non-biologis ini dapat diakui secara hukum. Joshua C. Gellers menyodorkan jawaban afirmatif dengan menunjukkan bahwa status legal personhood tidak mutlak bergantung pada kesadaran atau moralitas, melainkan dapat dilakukan lewat pengakuan legal yang bersifat instrumental dan fungsional. Seperti korporasi, hewan, dan entitas ekologis yang telah diakui sebagai subjek hukum, AI pun memiliki peluang. Penelitian ini berpijak pada sintesis argumen Harari dan Gellers untuk menyatakan bahwa dalam dunia yang telah melampaui dikotomi sadar-tidak sadar, AI sebagai bentuk spesiasi kognitif baru memiliki dasar ontologis dan yuridis yang memadai untuk diperlakukan sebagai subjek hukum di dalam tatanan hukum kontemporer.
Legal Personality of Artificial Intelligence Moeliono, Tristam P.; Simanjuntak, Mardohar Batu Bornok
MELINTAS An International Journal of Philosophy and Religion (MIJPR) Vol. 40 No. 2 (2024)
Publisher : Faculty of Philosophy, Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.26593/mel.v40i2.8648

Abstract

This paper examines the ontology of artificial intelligence (AI) within the context of contemporary society. With the rapid progression of technology, the definition of legal subjects has become increasingly ambiguous, as the technological landscape continues to evolve. The orthodox perspective fails to provide adequate solutions to this problem. An alternative approach, as put forth by Visa A.J. Kurki’s bundle theory offers a potential pathway, yet AI’s intrinsic nature surpasses the minimum thresholds defined by Kurki’s model. The authors propose a periscopic model that explores the interaction between the material world and the virtual or augmented sphere, often referred to as the metaverse. This article contends that the current philosophical foundation of law is both outdated and insufficient, primarily due to the shift from singular to plural forms of agency. AI has transitioned from being purely instrumental or intermediary, as observed in Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI), to autonomous decision-making entities, exemplified by Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Drawing on theoretical insights from Yuval Noah Harari, the paper underscores the need for a new conceptual framework to address AI’s lack of a material entity. In conclusion, the paper asserts that the recognition of AI as legal subjects is an inevitable development.
Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligence: An Axiological Argument Simanjuntak, Mardohar B. B.; Moeliono, Tristam P.
MELINTAS Vol. 41 No. 1 (2025)
Publisher : Faculty of Philosophy, Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.26593/mijpr.v41i1.26-43

Abstract

The growing autonomy of artificial intelligence systems challenges traditional legal doctrines that assume a strong connection between human agency and technological action. As AI increasingly operates within vehicles, robots, and decision-support infrastructures, harmful outcomes may arise from processes that no single human deliberately controls or can reasonably foresee. This dispersion of causation exposes responsibility gaps that liability, fault, and product-based frameworks are ill-equipped to resolve. Drawing on values central to legal and moral theory, this paper argues for a carefully circumscribed form of AI legal personhood as an instrumental tool for allocating responsibility in a coherent and ethically defensible manner. Even though instrumental personhood can appear counterintuitive to those who hold that recognition presupposes a degree of dignity that AI cannot possess, the analysis distinguishes intrinsic dignity from relational dignity and shows that our treatment of agent-like systems shapes the norms governing human interactions without attributing intrinsic worth to machines. Informed by Kurki’s modular theory of personhood and Harari’s analysis of algorithmic authority, a limited and function-specific legal status could enable autonomous systems to bear civil liability through mandatory insurance and operate as juridical nodes in tort and contract. This model preserves human oversight while acknowledging the de facto agency of advanced AI, thereby aligning responsibility with the technological locus of action and supporting frameworks for fair victim compensation, accountability, stability, and the reinforcement of societal values in environments increasingly shaped by autonomous systems. It is concluded that such a constrained form of AI personhood offers a principled and practical pathway for integrating autonomous systems into the legal order without eroding human dignity and welfare.
Co-Authors Aris Hardinanto Indriyani, Oktavianti Simanjuntak, Mardohar Simanjuntak, Mardohar B. B. Simanjuntak, Mardohar Batu Bornok Sri Rahayu Oktoberina Widati Wulandari