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Reconfiguring Rivalry: Ideological Sorting, Digital Media, and the New Landscape of Affective Polarization in the Post-2024 Presidential Election in Indonesia Ervin Munandar; Yuniarti Maretha Pasaribu; Firzan Dahlan; Aaliyah El-Hussaini
Open Access Indonesia Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 8 No. 4 (2025): Open Access Indonesia Journal of Social Sciences
Publisher : HM Publisher

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.37275/oaijss.v8i4.294

Abstract

The 2024 Indonesian presidential election marked a tectonic shift in its political landscape, dissolving the decade-long 'Cebong versus Kampret' rivalry. This study investigates whether this realignment led to depolarization or a reconfiguration of partisan animosity. It examines the structure and predictors of affective polarization in the immediate post-election environment. A cross-sectional survey was conducted from May to July 2024, involving 1,500 respondents across 15 provinces, selected via a multi-stage random sampling method with probability proportional to size. Affective polarization was measured using a feeling thermometer scale. Key predictors—including ideological self-placement, social media consumption for political news, and intergroup contact—were analyzed using hierarchical multiple regression. To test for non-linear ideological effects, both linear and quadratic terms for ideology were included in the model. The analysis reveals that affective polarization remains a potent force. The regression model showed a strong fit (R2= 0.47). While a linear measure of ideology was not a significant predictor, its quadratic term was a powerful and positive predictor (b = 0.42, p<0.001), indicating a U-shaped relationship where individuals at both ideological poles exhibit significantly higher polarization than those in the center. High consumption of partisan social media was also strongly associated with increased polarization (b = 0.35, p<0.001), while quality intergroup contact was linked to lower levels (b = -0.21, p<0.001). In conclusion, the post-2024 political era in Indonesia is characterized by a reconfiguration, not a dissipation, of affective polarization. The cleavage is no longer primarily personality-driven but is increasingly structured by ideological sorting, amplified by digital media ecosystems. These findings highlight the need for initiatives promoting cross-cutting dialogue and digital literacy to safeguard democratic health.
Reconfiguring Rivalry: Ideological Sorting, Digital Media, and the New Landscape of Affective Polarization in the Post-2024 Presidential Election in Indonesia Ervin Munandar; Yuniarti Maretha Pasaribu; Firzan Dahlan; Aaliyah El-Hussaini
Open Access Indonesia Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 8 No. 4 (2025): Open Access Indonesia Journal of Social Sciences
Publisher : HM Publisher

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.37275/oaijss.v8i4.294

Abstract

The 2024 Indonesian presidential election marked a tectonic shift in its political landscape, dissolving the decade-long 'Cebong versus Kampret' rivalry. This study investigates whether this realignment led to depolarization or a reconfiguration of partisan animosity. It examines the structure and predictors of affective polarization in the immediate post-election environment. A cross-sectional survey was conducted from May to July 2024, involving 1,500 respondents across 15 provinces, selected via a multi-stage random sampling method with probability proportional to size. Affective polarization was measured using a feeling thermometer scale. Key predictors—including ideological self-placement, social media consumption for political news, and intergroup contact—were analyzed using hierarchical multiple regression. To test for non-linear ideological effects, both linear and quadratic terms for ideology were included in the model. The analysis reveals that affective polarization remains a potent force. The regression model showed a strong fit (R2= 0.47). While a linear measure of ideology was not a significant predictor, its quadratic term was a powerful and positive predictor (b = 0.42, p<0.001), indicating a U-shaped relationship where individuals at both ideological poles exhibit significantly higher polarization than those in the center. High consumption of partisan social media was also strongly associated with increased polarization (b = 0.35, p<0.001), while quality intergroup contact was linked to lower levels (b = -0.21, p<0.001). In conclusion, the post-2024 political era in Indonesia is characterized by a reconfiguration, not a dissipation, of affective polarization. The cleavage is no longer primarily personality-driven but is increasingly structured by ideological sorting, amplified by digital media ecosystems. These findings highlight the need for initiatives promoting cross-cutting dialogue and digital literacy to safeguard democratic health.
Synthetic Reality and the Erosion of Epistemic Trust: Deepfake Misinformation, Confirmation Bias, and Democratic Cynicism Among Indonesian Voters Yuniarti Maretha Pasaribu; Aaliyah El-Hussaini
Open Access Indonesia Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 9 No. 3 (2026): Open Access Indonesia Journal of Social Sciences
Publisher : HM Publisher

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.37275/oaijss.v9i3.326

Abstract

Background: Synthetic media generated by artificial intelligence (deepfakes) threatens democratic consolidation, yet most evidence is Western and video-centred and rarely models how such media shapes citizens' political attitudes. Objective: Grounded in epistemic-trust theory, motivated-reasoning theory, and the Liar's Dividend thesis, this study examined how the illusion of authenticity, confirmation-bias acceleration, and perception of the Liar's Dividend relate to democratic cynicism among Indonesian voters, and whether confirmation bias mediates and synthetic-media literacy moderates these relationships. Methods: A nested mixed-methods design combined computational extraction of 4,200 synthetic-media items (detector F1 = 0.92), a cross-sectional survey of 3,000 adults recruited by proportional random sampling across three urban centres in Indonesia, and digital ethnography with 50 key informants. Results: The novel Epistemic Trust Erosion Scale demonstrated strong reliability (total alpha = 0.893; subscales 0.77 to 0.85) and sampling adequacy (KMO = 0.93). Cloned-audio deepfakes were trusted by 76.2% of respondents but consciously detected by only 11.5%, inverting the global assumption of video primacy. Illusion of authenticity (beta = 0.256), confirmation bias (beta = 0.269), and Liar's Dividend perception (beta = 0.212) each predicted democratic cynicism (all p < 0.001), explaining 33.0% of its variance (F(3, 2996) = 492.57, p < 0.001, f-squared = 0.493). Confirmation bias partially mediated the authenticity-cynicism pathway (indirect effect = 0.153, 95% CI [0.135, 0.172]). Synthetic-media literacy lowered cynicism but did not buffer the pathway. Conclusion: The findings extend deepfake scholarship to oral, messaging-centred Global-South publics and inform electoral-integrity policy.
Synthetic Reality and the Erosion of Epistemic Trust: Deepfake Misinformation, Confirmation Bias, and Democratic Cynicism Among Indonesian Voters Yuniarti Maretha Pasaribu; Aaliyah El-Hussaini
Open Access Indonesia Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 9 No. 3 (2026): Open Access Indonesia Journal of Social Sciences
Publisher : HM Publisher

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.37275/oaijss.v9i3.326

Abstract

Background: Synthetic media generated by artificial intelligence (deepfakes) threatens democratic consolidation, yet most evidence is Western and video-centred and rarely models how such media shapes citizens' political attitudes. Objective: Grounded in epistemic-trust theory, motivated-reasoning theory, and the Liar's Dividend thesis, this study examined how the illusion of authenticity, confirmation-bias acceleration, and perception of the Liar's Dividend relate to democratic cynicism among Indonesian voters, and whether confirmation bias mediates and synthetic-media literacy moderates these relationships. Methods: A nested mixed-methods design combined computational extraction of 4,200 synthetic-media items (detector F1 = 0.92), a cross-sectional survey of 3,000 adults recruited by proportional random sampling across three urban centres in Indonesia, and digital ethnography with 50 key informants. Results: The novel Epistemic Trust Erosion Scale demonstrated strong reliability (total alpha = 0.893; subscales 0.77 to 0.85) and sampling adequacy (KMO = 0.93). Cloned-audio deepfakes were trusted by 76.2% of respondents but consciously detected by only 11.5%, inverting the global assumption of video primacy. Illusion of authenticity (beta = 0.256), confirmation bias (beta = 0.269), and Liar's Dividend perception (beta = 0.212) each predicted democratic cynicism (all p < 0.001), explaining 33.0% of its variance (F(3, 2996) = 492.57, p < 0.001, f-squared = 0.493). Confirmation bias partially mediated the authenticity-cynicism pathway (indirect effect = 0.153, 95% CI [0.135, 0.172]). Synthetic-media literacy lowered cynicism but did not buffer the pathway. Conclusion: The findings extend deepfake scholarship to oral, messaging-centred Global-South publics and inform electoral-integrity policy.