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Constitutional Review
Published by Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia
ISSN : 24600016     EISSN : 25483870     DOI : -
Core Subject : Social,
Law, Crime, Criminology & Criminal Justice Social Sciences
Constitutional Review is a law journal published by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia twice a year. The primary purpose of this journal is to disseminate research, conceptual analysis and other writings of scientific nature on constitutional issues. Articles published cover various topics on constitutions, constitutional courts, constitutional court decisions and issues on constitutional law either in Indonesia or other countries all over the world. This journal is designed to be an international law journal and intended as a forum for legal scholarship which discusses ideas and insights from law professors, legal scholars, judges and practitioners.
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Articles 164 Documents
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Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech: When Values Collide in Divided Societies Bertus de Villiers
Constitutional Review Vol 8, No 2 (2022)
Publisher : The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.31078/consrev821

Abstract

One of the thorniest issues in law, especially concerning the boundaries of what is reasonable and proportionate, is the distinction between freedom of expression and hate speech. Striking a balance between freedom of expression and hate speech is, however, not a mere exercise in theory; it goes to the core of respect of individual rights and freedoms. To one person, uttering speech pursuant to the right to free expression is essential for a free and open democratic society; whereas another person, offended by what they perceive as hatred, can experience such speech as an attack on their identity and self-worth, causing harm, fear and anxiety that deny their individual rights to equality, identity and dignity. This paper gives a brief overview of jurisprudential developments in international law concerning speech that may fall within the category of hate speech, whereafter two prominent South African judgments by the Equality Court are discussed. Those two judgments highlight the complexities in determining when speech can be regarded as hate speech; what test is applied to ascertain whether speech constitutes hate speech; what evidence is required for a finding to be made; and the effect of a declaratory order. The two judgments discussed, the Nelson Mandela Trust and Ors v. AfriForum and Ors (Old Flag case 2019) and the AfriForum and Economic Freedom Fighters and Ors (Kill the Boer Case 2022), attempted to determine the line that separates freedom of expression from hate speech. The judgments, perhaps not unexpectedly, have given rise to more questions than answers. The inconsistency in comparative jurisprudence reaffirms that the labelling of speech as hate speech should be reserved for the most extreme forms of speech; it should be proportionate to the speech, including who expressed it, where and when; and any declaration should only be directed at the specific incident and not restrict speech in general.
Creating Rights, Terminating Rights, Overcoming Legal Conflicts Roy Andrew Partain
Constitutional Review Vol 8, No 2 (2022)
Publisher : The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.31078/consrev822

Abstract

At the heart of this paper are judges and their obligations to ensure that conflicts over fragmented rights are cured, that fundamental rights are stewarded, and that justice prevails. There are several respected legal theories that have never been examined together before, but when three of them are placed in a nexus of constitutional law, we find that these ideas support broad powers for courts to control the distribution and allocation of rights, enabling the resolution of conflicts at many social levels. First, a succession of scholars has identified the risks of ‘fragmenting rights’, of allocating overlapping rights to too many parties. The danger presented is that those rights-holders may lose the use of their legal rights or privileges; this outcome is known as the ‘Tragedy of the Anticommons’. Too many rights held by too many parties, a ‘fragmentation of rights’, can lead to a lack of access to rights and a lack of access to justice. Second, the legal theories of Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase, who found that initial allocations of rights across a community might have been allocated in a manner that frustrates negotiations and other means to avoid conflicts; but judges have an opportunity and an obligation to reset those allocations of rights to better enable society toflourish. Third, Yale constitutional scholar Robert Cover wrote that judges can and should terminate claims of overlapping rights so that the litigious parties, and society at large, can return to a more harmonious co-existence. Cover wrote that this methodology of ‘jurispathic’ judges was both an ethical and a robust means of solving Dworkin’s ‘hard cases’. This paper investigates the nexus of these three jurisprudences and what the impact of their nexus is for constitutional scholars. This paper delivers original theoretical legal findings and provides functional approaches to best enable the resolution of conflicts before courts and the maintenance of rights and privileges for all parties. This paper documents an argument that courts, especially constitutional courts, have more power to solve social conflicts and other conflicts arising from legal rules and culturesthan many constitutional law scholars may have previously assumed feasible.
Influencing or Intervention? Impact of Constitutional Court Decisions on the Supreme Court in Indonesia Dian Agung Wicaksono; Faiz Rahman
Constitutional Review Vol 8, No 2 (2022)
Publisher : The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.31078/consrev823

Abstract

The third amendment of Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution, conducted in 2001, had significant implications for the nation’s judiciary. It transformed the judiciary from a single to a dual structure. Consequently, there are two apexes of the judiciary: the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, the establishment of the Constitutional Court divided judicial review authority between the two apex courts. The Constitutional Court can review laws against the Constitution, while the Supreme Court has the power to review whether regulations, made under laws, contradict such laws. Although the Indonesian Constitution provides explicit delineations over the absolute competence of judicial review, the division of judicial review has often triggered tension between the two courts. The Constitution allows the Supreme Court to have additional authorities granted by laws. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court has the power to review any law against the Constitution, including laws related to the Supreme Court. This article seeks to answer the important question of whether the Constitutional Court could influence or intervene in the Supreme Court through judicial review. The authors argue that the duality of judicial review authority unintentionally causes an imbalance in the functional relationship between the two apexes of the judiciary. The main reason is that the Constitutional Court can influence or intervene in the Supreme Court through constitutional review authority. The authors examine two essential aspects of this: (1) the functional implications of duality of judicial review authority; and (2) the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s authority in reviewing laws, especially those closely related to the Supreme Court’s authorities. Various cases are examined to illustrate how the Constitutional Court could directly or indirectly influence the Supreme Courts’ authorities. The Constitutional Court, however, often seems to ‘play safe’ to maintain the judiciary’s imbalanced relationship caused by the dualism of judicial review authority.
Conflict Resolution in Human Rights Cases: The Role of the Supreme Court of Canada Miriam Cohen; Sarah-Michèle Vincent-Wright
Constitutional Review Vol 8, No 2 (2022)
Publisher : The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.31078/consrev824

Abstract

This paper examines the role of the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in resolving human rights conflicts and balancing individual and collective rights. With a multiple control mission, the Court must interpret the Constitution and resolve disputes over competing rights and interests, based on the principle of constitutional democracy. This paper specifically focuses on the SCC’s role in conflict resolution in human rights cases, especially in the complex legal framework of protection existing in Canada. It also addresses how the Court’s rulings may affect the protection of fundamental rights under the Canadian Charter, illustrated by some key examples from the Court’s caselaw. To this end, the first part provides a descriptive overview of the complex fabric of human rights protection in the Canadian constitutional framework. The second part discusses the SCC’s role in protecting human rights within the Canadian legal system. Ultimately, this paper underscores the fundamental role of a Supreme Court in protecting human rights in situations of multiple rights conflicts. 
Conscientious Objection Before the Indonesian Constitutional Court Heribertus Jaka Triyana
Constitutional Review Vol 8, No 2 (2022)
Publisher : The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.31078/consrev825

Abstract

The issuance of Indonesia’s Law No. 23 of 2019 on the Management of National Resources for State Defense (PSDN Law) sparked a national debate on conscription and conscientious objection. Consequently, a coalition of civic society organizations submitted the PSDN Law before the Constitutional Court for judicial review. They argued that the PSDN Law violates the Indonesian Constitution’s Article 28 on human rights protection. One of the legal submissions is based on the argument that the PSDN Law deliberately ignores human rights in order to provide reserve and backup components to the military. This argument is supported by Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the ICCPR’s General Comment No. 22 of 1993 paragraph 11, justifying conscientious objection as an inherent human right. The analysis in this paper is mainly uses the legal positivism paradigm and the human rights-based approach. This paradigm provides a framework for analyzing how the PSDN Law generates a distinctive legal feature for Indonesia’s legal system. In line with Article 28 of the Indonesian Constitution, the Constitutional Court should explicitly assess the preservation of civil rights. It may be claimed that conceivable legal gaps (norm versus reality) and legal loopholes add to the Constitutional Court’s obligation to consider the omission of conscientious objection recognition. This article argues the Constitutional Court should adjudicate on the issue of citizens being conscripted as reserve and backup components in situations of military threats, hybrid threats and/or non-military threats. This research further maintains that the Constitutional Court should recognize the existence of conscientious objection as an inherent human right, as a form of judicial activism. In accordance with the doctrine of judicial activism, the Court could resolve and offer solutions to the existence of conscientious objection as a democratic civil right. The Court should also determine the area, scope, application and orientation of conscientious objection as a distinct feature of human rights based on Indonesia’s context and perspective on defense required by international human rights treaties, conventions, or general comments on such instruments.
Exporting a Constitutional Court to Brunei? Benefits and Prospects Ann Black
Constitutional Review Vol 8, No 2 (2022)
Publisher : The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.31078/consrev826

Abstract

Negara Brunei Darussalam (Brunei) is Asia’s only, and one of the world’s few remaining, absolute monarchies. Brunei’s much-venerated Sultan and Yang Di Pertuan Agong is accountable to only Allah as his “shadow on earth”. Within the Sultanate he is head of religion, Prime Minister, and as Sultan he appoints all members to the nation’s six advisory Councils. He is above the law and is the country’s legislator. He can amend the constitution and bypass the Legislative Council without court oversight. Judicial review was formally abolished in 2004. The accrual of power – judicial, religious, legislative, and executive – in the hands of one man is only possible by the continued renewal of a state of emergency. Since 1962, the state of emergency has been renewed every two years and once Brunei is in a state of emergency, all powers devolve to its Sultan. There is an absence of any effective checks and balances mechanism such as a democratically elected Legislative Council, a free and open media, a judiciary with powers of constitutional review, an accountable executive government, or an engaged civil society. Because the constitutionality of sixty years of emergency rule in Brunei has never been judicially determined, this paper argues it would be the first task for an independent Constitutional Court. The need for such determination on the legitimacy of Brunei’s biennial emergency proclamations is set out and a case made as to why a Constitutional Court could be the circuit breaker for a return democratic participation, rule of law, and fundamental human rights in the Sultanate. There is reflection on the obstacles to any reform which make the prospects for this unlikely in the lifetime of the current Sultan.
The Rejection of the Voice for Aboriginal People in Australia – A Postmortem of Causes of Failure Bertus de Villiers
Constitutional Review Vol. 10 No. 2 (2024)
Publisher : The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.31078/consrev1021

Abstract

On 14 October 2023, the Australian electorate rejected by an overwhelming majority a proposal for a constitutionally guaranteed advisory body, to be called the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Voice. This was the fourth attempt in Australia to create an advisory voice for Aboriginal people, but the first time it was attempted via a constitutional amendment involving a public vote. The rejection is continuing to reverberate through Australian society. To many Aboriginal people this was not only a rejection of a technical proposal, but a rejection of their aspirations of self-determination. This article reflects on some of the root causes why in the view of the author, the referendum failed. The article is critical of the lack of information about the composition and functions of the proposed Voice as well as the inconsistencies between various reports and public documents. These contributed to public scepticism and rejection of the proposal.
Threat to Indonesia’s Constitutional Court Independence Posed by Religious Populist Movements and its Implication Towards Human Rights Cekli Setya Pratiwi
Constitutional Review Vol. 10 No. 2 (2024)
Publisher : The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.31078/consrev1022

Abstract

One of the biggest challenges to a democratic state under the rule of law today is rising populist movements that endanger the independence of the judiciary. In Indonesia, the religious populist movement led by hardliner Islamic groups continues to try to enter courtrooms to advocate for religious interpretations of court decisions, such as when the Indonesian Constitutional Court reviews the 1965 anti-blasphemy law. This socio-legal research examines empirical data from key resource interviews and secondary data from related Constitutional Court judgements, pertinent legislation, and public policies to determine the socio-political backdrop of the Court decision. This technique enables the author to evaluate religious populism and how it affects Constitutional Court rulings. Political pressure may weaken the court, according to this research, encourage the religious populism of the former of Islamic Defenders Front to impose its will by stating that the repeal of the Anti-Blasphemy Law shows strong indications of corruption within the Court. Religious populism in the justice system raises concerns about political or religious decision-making, thereby undermining the rule of law. This research shows that the pattern or tendency of religious populism shows the Court’s compromise of the legal system towards democratic government in Indonesia, eroding the independence of the judiciary, endangering the right to religious freedom, and weakening public confidence in the justice system and democracy.
Weak-Form Review and Judicial Independence: A Comparative Perspective Mirza Satria Buana
Constitutional Review Vol. 10 No. 2 (2024)
Publisher : The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.31078/consrev1023

Abstract

This article examines the Court’s judicial review power that has gradually shifted from a strong-form review into a weak-form review. The shifting into weak-form review may affect judicial independence, both de facto or de jure, because Justices have considered the Legislature’s responds on the Court’s decisions. This approach diminishes the Court’s supremacy toward lawmakers. This article explores comparative insights from various countries that utilize those reviews, notably the United States of America (strong review), and commonwealth countries (weak review). It also elaborates on some ‘anomalies’ from both reviews. It raises two important questions: what insights can be learned from other countries’ judicial practices, particularly on the use of weak- form review? And, does weak-form review suitable to be enforced in Indonesia’s context? The weak review that is manifested in conditional decisions claims to be more politically palatable. Despite that strategic reason, the practice of conditional decision is prone to misuse as it could decrease constitutionalism and judicial independence. This paper argues that the weak-form review is not suitable for Indonesia’s constitutional law context, because the country lacks prerequisites and preconditions of strong control through parliament. The Indonesian Constitutional Court must return to its genuine authority as a strong-form review to strengthen legal constitutionalism.
The Relationship Between the Constitutional Judges’ Selection by the House of Representatives and The Position of Judges in Judicial Review Decisions Muchamad Ali Safa’at; Aan Eko Widiarto; Haru Permadi; Muhammad Dahlan
Constitutional Review Vol. 10 No. 2 (2024)
Publisher : The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.31078/consrev1024

Abstract

The two issues raised in this study are the selection mechanism for constitutional judges nominated by the House of Representative (DPR) and the correlation between the selection of constitutional judges nominated by the DPR and the position of the judge in the decision to review the law. This research analizes the position of the constitutional judges on 8 judicial review decision which correlated to the authority and interests of the DPR. Judges who are nominated through a highly transparent and participatory selection process or a transparent and participatory process may rule in favor of or against the interests of the DPR. However, judges who are nominated through a selection process that is not transparent and participatory will all make decisions in favor of the interests of the DPR. That finding show that the judge nominated through a highly transparent and participatory selection process tends to be more independent than the judge nominated through less transparent and participatory selection process.

Page 16 of 17 | Total Record : 164

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