The independence of the General Elections Commission (KPU) as an election organizing institution is constitutionally guaranteed; however, in practice, KPU's authority to create regulations is often constrained by the obligation to consult with the People's Representative Council (DPR) and the Government. This study uses a normative legal method with a statutory approach to analyze the legal politics behind the consultation requirement between KPU, DPR, and the Government in the process of forming KPU regulations. The research findings indicate that this obligation is not based on a strong philosophical or legal foundation, but rather on DPR's concern about the possibility that KPU may refrain from consulting with them. Therefore, a change in phrasing from “must” to “may” in the consultation norm is necessary to restore KPU's position as a truly independent institution, in accordance with the constitutional mandate. This change will allow KPU to operate more freely and objectively in making decisions without unnecessary pressure or intervention, in line with the spirit of electoral reform that aims for greater transparency and accountability.