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Journal : Integralistik

JUDICIAL REVIEW  SEBAGAI MEKANISME KONTROL TERHADAP PERATURAN PERUNDAN-UNDANGAN: Judicial review, Mahkamah Agung, Mahkamah Konstitusi. Sunarto; Eta Yuni Lestari
Integralistik Vol. 35 No. 1 (2024): Januari 2024
Publisher : Universitas Negeri Semarang

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.15294/rsx99491

Abstract

Kehadiran lembaga Mahkamah Konstitusi dengan kewenangan yang dimiliknya, telah membawa perubahan yang signifikan  dalam sistem ketatanegaraan Indonesia, di antaranya berkenaan dengan pengujian terhadap peraturan perundang-undangan (judicial review). Kalau sebelumnya pengujian  hanya bisa dilakukan oleh Mahkamah Agung atas peraturan-perundang-undangan di bawah undang-undang terhadap undang-undang,   dengan munculnya Mahkamah Konstitusi  memungkinkan terjadinya pengujian  undang-undang terhadap undang-undang dasar. Judicial review yang dilakukan oleh Mahkamah Agung dan Mahkamah Konstitusi  merupakan mekanisme kontrol lembaga yudikatif terhadap produk peraturan perundang-undangan yang dalam pembuatannya tidak lepas dari pegulatan di antara berbagai kepentingan politik Dengan adanya judisial review semua produk hukum berupa peraturan perundang-undangan tidak dapat lepas dari fungsi kontrol oleh lembaga yudikatif sehingga substansi maupun prosedur pembuatannyan lebih dapat dipertanggingjawabkan dari aspek hukum, dan bukan hanya merepresentasikan kepentingan politik semata.
Presidential Threshold  dalam Sistem Presidensiil dan Implikasinya terhadap Fungsi Pengawasan DPR Sunarto; Eta Yuni Lestari
Integralistik Vol. 37 No. 1 (2026): Januari :2026
Publisher : Universitas Negeri Semarang

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.15294/integralistik.v37i1.36177

Abstract

This study aims to analyze the relationship between the presidential threshold in Indonesia’s presidential system and the effectiveness of the House of Representatives (DPR) in carrying out its oversight function over government policies. The implementation of the presidential threshold, which was intended to strengthen political support for the elected president, has created a practical problem when non-supporting parties tend to join the ruling coalition after the election. This condition weakens the DPR’s oversight function, as the dominance of political compromise reduces the presence of effective opposition in parliament. This research employs a normative legal method using both statutory and conceptual approaches. The primary legal materials consist of constitutional and statutory provisions regulating the presidential system and the oversight authority of the DPR, while secondary materials include books and journal articles written by constitutional law scholars. The results indicate that political stability in a presidential system should not rely on the presidential threshold, but rather on the strength of the checks and balances mechanism between the executive and legislative branches. The Constitutional Court Decision No. 62/PUU-XXII/2024, which declared the presidential threshold unconstitutional, represents an important turning point to reinforce democratic representation and restore the DPR’s oversight function to be more independent, transparent, and accountable.