Claim Missing Document
Check
Articles

Found 32 Documents
Search

IUS CONSTITUENDUM CONTROL OF PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY IN ENACTING GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS IN LIEU OF LAWS TO MINIMIZE ABUSE OF POWER Adithya Tri Firmansyah R; Muchamad Ali Safa’at; Tunggul Anshari Setia Negara
International Journal of Educational Review, Law And Social Sciences (IJERLAS) Vol. 4 No. 1 (2024)
Publisher : CV. RADJA PUBLIKA

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.54443/ijerlas.v4i1.1327

Abstract

This research came from requestioning the existence of presidential’s subjective authority in enacting governmental ruling as replacement to a Law (hereinafter will be referred as Perppu), as according to Article 22 Clause (1) of Republic of Indonesia’s basic law of 1945 which havent ruled the strict limitation of presidential authority in determining matters of outmost emergency, this should be questioned because in reality indonesia still yet to fully shows an image befitting democratic country of law because the nonexistence of adequate control over the use of institutional power, and based on that, this research is necessary to be executed for it to offers a control of authority model for enacting a perppu by The President, result and topic of this research concluded that: First, when reading about history of Indonesian Constitution, there is nowhere to be found an adequate explanation about the existence of terms in Article 22 clause (1) Republic of Indoneisa’s basic law of 1945, but from developing doctrines, said terms are influenced by regulation about affairs of state during Dutch East-Indies era which providing clues about the exisrtence about matters of outmost emergency. Second, Presidential authority in determining matters of outmost emergency which take shape in form of perppu, is need to be controlled in the future by reconstruction the objectivity of Perppu in Parliament, inside a framework of meaningful participation and reconstruction of Constitutional Court’s authority on judicial control against the enactment of Perppu to minimize Abuse of Power.
An Alternative Model for Constitutional Question Adjudication in Indonesia: A Comparative Study of Ten Constitutional Court Jurisdictions Dhenasya Sukma Hardaningtyas; Muchamad Ali Safa'at; Dhia Al-Uyun
International Journal of Business, Law, and Education Vol. 7 No. 1 (2026): International Journal of Business, Law, and Education
Publisher : IJBLE Scientific Publications Community Inc.

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.56442/ijble.v7i1.1486

Abstract

Indonesia's constitutional review system entrusts the Constitutional Court with the authority to review statutes against the 1945 Constitution, yet it does not provide a procedural channel through which ordinary judges may refer constitutional doubts arising in pending cases. This doctrinal and comparative legal study formulates an alternative model of constitutional question adjudication for Indonesia by examining ten constitutional-court jurisdictions: Austria, Italy, Germany, South Africa, South Korea, Hungary, Croatia, Romania, the Czech Republic, and the Russian Federation. The study uses statutory, conceptual, case-based, and comparative approaches and analyses primary legal materials, constitutional-court legislation, judicial decisions, and relevant scholarship on centralized constitutional review and concrete norm control. The findings show that constitutional question mechanisms share several core features: they arise from concrete litigation, are normally initiated by judges, require the challenged norm to be decisive for the pending case, usually suspend the underlying proceedings, and produce decisions with binding force beyond the individual dispute. At the same time, the jurisdictions differ in their referral filters, admissibility thresholds, procedural timelines, and remedial effects. Building on these comparative findings, this article proposes a semi-mandatory judicial referral model for Indonesia. The model requires constitutional amendment to Article 24C of the 1945 Constitution, preliminary screening by the Supreme Court, strict admissibility criteria, a stay of proceedings, expedited review by the Constitutional Court, and final and binding decisions with erga omnes and limited retroactive effects. The proposed model preserves judicial independence, reduces the risk of docket congestion, and strengthens preventive protection of constitutional rights in concrete adjudication.